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http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/foia.html



F.O.I.A. REQUEST TO NSA
Print and Send


NSA/CSS FOIA Office (N5P5)
National Security Agency
9800 Savage Road STE 6248
Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6248


Dear Sir:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act.

    I request that a copy of the following pre-World War II documents
be released to the National Archives: all pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese
naval dispatches from October 1, 1940, through December 7, 1941, all
worksheets pertaining thereto, and all translations thereof.

    In order to help to determine my status to assess fees, you should
know that I am an individual seeking information for personal use and
not for commercial use. I ask only that this information be released
to the National Archives immediately as part of operation OPENDOOR.

    I request a waiver of all fees for this request.  Disclosure of the
requested information is in the public interest because it is likely to
contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or
activities of the government and is not primarily in my commercial
interest. In addition to your commitment to open government expressed
by executive order 12958, there should be commitment to the truth.


Thank you for your consideration of my request.

                                        Sincerely,
                                        (s)_____________________


                                        ________________________
                                        Street

                                        ________________________
                                        City            State

                                        ________________________
                                        Date



Note: Mention if you are a veteran

You will get a reply something like this:

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE. MARYAND 20755-15000


Dear Sir,

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of
12 May 1998 in which you ask that "the following pre-World War II documents
be released to the National Archives: all pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese naval
dispatches from October 1, 1940, through December 7, 1941, 11 worksheets
pertaining thereto, and al translations thereof."

The FOIA allows the public access to federal agency records, except to the
extent that such records are protected from disclosure by one of nine
exemptions. There is no provision of the FOIA which allows the public to
direct
the release of records to the National Archives. In accordance with the Dad
regulation, processing of your request is being held in abeyance pending a
response from you, within 30 days of the date of this letter, clarifying your
request.

Sincerely,

BARBARA PAISLEY
Chief
FOIA/PA Services


At that point, pick any order you care to from the Pre-PH Japanese Naval
Dispatches page and request the raw intercept, all 1941 translations and
worksheets pertaining to it. Say it is in JN-25 code and give the serial
number, date and time of the order, from whom to whom and copy its contents.

The Sacrifice of Bataan

Bataan & Corregidor

The loss of the Philippines was the greatest defeat of the United States Army but it has not received the attention that such distinction deserves. How was it possible, with perfect knowledge of the enemy's plans and greatly superior forces, that the U.S. lost a strong defensive position?
There were four critical steps. (1) The U.S. bombers were sacrificed on the ground. (2) MacArthur prevented food, ammunition, gas and other supplies from being stored on Bataan. (3) The remaining U.S. airforces were sent away December 17 just as the main Japanese force approached in convoy without air-cover. (4) Forces had to be misplaced at Lingayen Gulf.
  1. On the morning of December 7 (December 8 local time), hours after Pearl Harbor, MacArthur prevented air commander General Brereton from bombing Formosa. Dougout Doug further gave three conflicting orders that kept the B-17s at Clark Field on the ground most of the morning - bomb up, bombs off, bomb up. The Japanese attack was delayed because of fog. At 11:20, at the same moment that radar at Nichols Field near Manila reported a large mass of enemy planes approaching Clark from 140 miles out, MacArthur gave his final bomb-up order. MacArthur had about one hour to warn Clark and Iba Fields of the coming Japanese air attack and he did not. Instead he issued "Field Order Number One: Attack South Formosa at the latest daylight hour that visibility will permit." This order, time-stamped 11:20 A.M. but delivered at 11:45, is the one that kept the bombers on the ground at the critical moment. The bombers had to bomb up, be serviced and the crews rested for the late afternoon flight. This was the order that lost our airforce, given with full and complete knowledge that a large flight of Japanese bombers were coming in. MacArthur in his autobiography admits that "at 11:45 a report came in of an overpowering enemy formation closing in on Clark Field." *1 At 11:56 Brereton had to give a full report to MacArthur's Chief of Staff General Sutherland by phone, a way to keep both Brereton and the single phone line tied up in the critical few moments before the attack (note that Sutherland could have warned Brereton of the radar report but did not). MacArthur could control the teletype and radio but there was a danger that spotters would telephone Clark Field and warn them of the approaching planes.
  2. MacArthur said he was going to fight on the "beaches, beaches, beaches," but this plan which is sometimes attributed to MacArthur actually was imposed on him on 18 October 1941 by General Marshall. The plan to fight on the beaches was preposterous in October but after the Navy left and the air forces were knocked out on December 8, it was suicide. On December 8, MacArthur told his Chief of Staff General Sutherland they would have to "remove immediately to Bataan." He told the same thing to Quezon four days later. *2 President Quezon also spoke against the plan to fight on the beaches. In the two weeks prior to the main Japanese invasion, MacArthur, knowing that he would have to retreat to Bataan and told this also by General Wainwright and President Quezon, refused to move supplies there. The Orange and Rainbow war plans since 1909 had included plans to move supplies to Bataan - that had been changed by Marshall on 18 October 1941. This change of defense to a plan of defending all beaches against superior forces, was not just nonsense on its face, but a deliberate sacrifice of all U.S. troops in the Philippines and of the Philippines themselves. Even on its own terms it was no plan at all. It was smoke to cover the sacrifice of the Philippines. The plan required a very large concentration of U.S. warships to defend the Philippines and Washington had ordered the Pacific fleet south, indicating that there was no plan to defend the beaches. The plan required air superiority which had been lost the first day. Early on the Japanese invaded both in the north and in the south - December 10 at Apparri and Vigan and December 12 at Legaspi. MacArthur did not even attempt to repel them, proving the "beaches" plan was a farce. That slogan was simply a ruse to prevent the supplying of Bataan. When the Japanese landed at Lingayen, MacArthur abandoned the beaches plan within two days. Some strategy! MacArthur also wouldn't invoke the Orange plan WPO-3 until December 24th after the Japanese had landed in force at 9 points. He lost 500,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 3,400,000 gallons of oil and gasoline plus food, clothing and medicines on the beaches. At the single depot at Cabanatuan, he left fifty million bushels of rice, enough to feed all the troops on Bataan for four years. Just 70 miles from Bataan quartermasters found 2000 cases of canned fish but were ordered directly and repeatedly by MacArthur's headquarters to abandon them or face court-martial. Besides not supplying Bataan, MacArthur went to extraordinary lengths to make sure no food was taken there. He deliberately starved his men. *3 On 24 January 1942, Bataan was ordered to send food to the already well-stocked Corregidor which had a six-months supply for 10,000 men. The men on Bataan were starving. This order was to further reduce them. *4
    On February 23rd FDR made a radio address to the troops on Bataan to discourage them and inform that they would receive no relief. While Soviet Communists were being rushed billions of dollars of supplies, nothing, not even food, could be spared our men on Bataan. They were left to starve and rot. This is in stark contrast to what happened on Guadalcanal just a few months later. There submarines and fast destroyers supplied our forces and even tankers full of gasoline were sent in and grounded so the troops could be well stocked. It would have been easy to break the "paper blockade", as MacArthur called it, around the Philippines especially since we were reading the Japanese fleet code and could avoid interception. Not only submarines could have supplied Bataan, and the Asiatic Fleet stationed at Manila had the largest submarine force in the U.S. Navy, but large supply ships could have stood off in the south islands and fast coast-runners could have brought the supplies to Bataan at night. MacArthur wrote, "Since the blockade was lightly held, many medium-sized ships could have been loaded with supplies and dispatched along various routes. It seemed incredible to me that no effort was made to bring in supplies." Japanese records show that commanding General Homma, who had about half as many troops as MacArthur, was ready to give up: "If only help could have reached the Philippines, even in small form, if only limited reinforcement could have been supplied, the end could not have failed to be a success." (It is incongruous for MacArthur to complain about lack of supplies when he was responsible.) Obviously, since ships were frequently sent out from Corregidor and Bataan in the spring of 1942, MacArthur himself leaving with a flotilla of PT boats on March 11, ships could have equally well have been sent in. However, saving the 31,095 Americans on Bataan was not going to happen - it was the last thing Roosevelt wanted. Some clue to his thinking was his suggestion of surrender to MacArthur rather early on in February, "I authorize you to arrange for the capitulation of the Filipino elements of the defending forces..." This discloses intent. This was at a time when President Quezon controlled seventy-five percent of his country, the Japanese really only controlled the cities and the Japanese general was ready to give up. MacArthur did not think it was a good idea partly because Roosevelt, in typical fashion, had worded his letter so that MacArthur would take the blame. *5

  3. The Japanese main invasion on December 22 at Lingayen Gulf consisted of three transport echelons. "The first was composed of twenty-seven transports from Takio under the command of Rear Admiral Kensaburo Hara, the second of twenty-eight transports from Mako under Rear Admiral Yoji Nishimura, the third of twenty-one transports from Keeling under Rear Admiral Sueto Hirose." This force of seventy-six transports carried the main part of Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma's 80,000 strong Fourteenth Army. MacArthur correctly predicted the landing site long in advance, probably through decoded JN-25B messages. Homma's transports were surprisingly given no air support or cover whatever. *6 With perfect timing, Washington ordered all bombers to Australia on December 17th just as the invasion forces embarked. It was vital to prevent the American bombers from wreaking havoc on this invasion force when in their vulnerable transports. As it was, the Philippine Army greatly outnumbered the Japanese and there was danger of strong resistance, particularly in light of the marked inferior quality of Japanese artillery and tanks. To give some idea of the devastation that heavy strategic bombers would have caused to the Japanese transports, MacArthur mentions that of the twelve transports that approached the Philippines on December 10 (after Clark had been wiped out), four were sunk and three damaged. The horrific slaughter our bombers would have wreaked on defenseless transports is almost unimaginable. The invasion would have been a total debacle.

  4. MacArthur, armed with perfect intelligence of enemy intentions from codebreaking, had from December 8 to December 22 to place his troops. He misplaced his troops at the head of Lingayen Gulf and left the obvious landing zone of the 120 mile Eastern Shore lightly defended by two Filipino divisions, one of which had no artillery. Fortunately for the Japanese, when they landed they were unopposed because the Japanese landing ships foundered horribly in the surf and it took them a long time with extreme difficulty to get their men and especially tanks and artillery ashore. When the Japanese landed, MacArthur demonstrated how hollow and false the "defend the beaches" joke was and immediately ordered the retreat to Bataan on December 24.

CONCLUSION

The destruction of MacArthur's air forces on the ground after nine hours warning and direct orders to bomb Formosa was the greatest blunder the history of war and his loss of the Philippines was the greatest defeat of the U.S. Army. It is remarkable how MacArthur escaped any reprimand, kept his command and got his fourth star on December 17th and a Congressional Medal of Honor for "gallantry and intrepidity" at Bataan where he spent part of only one day, 10 January 1942, on inspection. He was awarded the medal after he had already fled and deserted his troops. His ultimate reward was orders to leave the Philippines with his family while his soldiers were subjected to the deadly brutality of the Bataan Death March. The defense of the Philippines cannot be understood in terms of conventional military strategy. In those terms it was one incomprehensible blunder after another, done with due deliberation and afterward profusely rewarded. Just as Clauswitz said war is politics by other means, the sacrifice of the Philippines can only be understood in the larger political context. Analysis of local decisions by MacArthur, miss the point that FDR was actually calling the shots. His motivations, not MacArthur's are at issue. The sacrifice of the 31,095 Americans and 80 thousand Filipino troops with 26 thousand refugees on Bataan is a separate issue from the sacrifice of the Army Air Corps at Clark and Iba.
The bombers were sacrificed, not only to facilitate the loss of the Philippines, but more immediately to sucker Hitler into declaring war on the United States and events in the Philippines are analogous to Pearl Harbor which happened the same day. However, Hitler did declare war on December 11th and therefore obviously the sacrifice of Bataan proper springs from other motives. To understand Roosevelt's strategy we have to ask a very basic question: Cui bono? "Who benefits?" Who benefited from Japan's temporary ascendancy and the war dragging on? It was obvious that when the Japanese Empire collapsed that there would be a power vacuum in Asia. The ultimate question of the Pacific War was who would fill that vacuum. Who would take China? Roosevelt wanted Russia to fill the vacuum (cf. his actions at Yalta and How the Far East Was Lost, Dr. Anthony Kubek, 1963) and therefore had to prolong the war so the Soviet Union could pick up the pieces. Because the Soviet Union had its hands full fighting Germany and could not dominate Asia until the war in Europe was under control, delay in the defeat of Japan was necessary. Bataan was a pawn in a larger game. The Battling Bastards of Bataan never understood enough to ask the critical question - "who was their real enemy?" It was Franklin Roosevelt.
The orders to fight on all beaches and not supply Bataan were nothing less than the deliberate sacrifice of 31,095 Americans.

References

1 Reminiscences, Douglas MacArthur, p 117.
2 "remove immediately", Philippines the Continuing Past, R. and L.
Constantino, page 46.
3 American Ceasar, William Manchester, knew he had to go to Bataan, p 196;
Cabantuan, ibid, p 215; war plans ibid p 194; January 10, ibid, p 235;
Supplies lost, 4th star, Blood, Tears and Folly, Len Deighton, pp 570, 571;
fish, Our Last Ditch, John Whitman, 1990. pp 46-47.
4 The Continuing Past, R. and L. Constantino, p 46.
5 Reminiscences, MacArthur, p 133, 128; Guadalcanal contrast, Oil and War,
Robert Goralski and Russell Freeburg, p 157; FDR to MacArthur, Reminiscences,
p 139.
6 No air cover - Fall of the Philippines, Louis Morton, 1953, official
Army History, p 128.

Pre Pearl Harbor Japanese Diplomatic Intercepts



PRE-PEARL HARBOR
JAPANESE
DIPLOMATIC INTERCEPTS

MAGIC


                           JULY 1941



 #July  7  A ____  _____   I. B. 1-155     "The Jap Govt."do not at present

                                           feel compelled to modify their

                                           policy towards the USSR." (JD

                                           3461)

 *July 24  N ____  _____   ___________     Memo to Naval Aide to the

                                           President re withdrawal of Jap

                                           merchant vessels from the

                                           Atlantic Ocean.



                           AUGUST 1941



 *Aug.  4  N ____  _____   GZ-1            Jap Decisions at Imperial

                                           Conference, July 2, 1941"to break

                                           British-American encirclement and

                                           arm for all-out war.

 #Aug.  9  N ____  _____   GZ-4            Preparation for the southward

                                           advance shall be reinforced.



                           OCTOBER 1941





 #Oct.  8  A 5693  23220  Tokyo 647       The internal situation here"would

                                          not permit further delay.

  Oct.  9  A 5696  23260  Tokyo #83       Area designations in Pearl Harbor

                                          (for spy reports).

  Oct. 10  N 5730  23312  Honolulu #41    Dock & Mooring designations in

                                          Pearl Harbor (for spy reports).

 #Oct. 10  N 5738  23318  Harbin 129      Promise of American aid

                                          to Russia.

 #Oct. 13  N 5779  23421  Tokyo 658       "The situation at home is fast

                                          approaching a crisis."

 #Oct. 13  N ____  _____  GZ-9            Crisis in Japan (see JD 5779).

  Oct. 17  N 5898  23629  Rome 661        Evacuation of Japanese merchants

                                          from Europe.

  Oct. 18  N 5923  23677  Tokyo 682       Resignation of Jap cabinet.

  Oct. 23  A 6017  23859  Wash.           Nomura submits his resignation. "I

                                          don't want to continue this hypo-

                                          critical existence deceiving

                                          other people . . . As a man of

                                          honor this is the only way open to

                                          me." (This is why Kurusu was

                                          sent.)

  Oct. 27  A 6084  23996  Wash. 989       "The Chief of Staff has sent the

                                          Military Attache some secret

                                          advice. Is this the future policy

                                          of the Government."

  Oct. 26  N 6118  24070  Mex. City 422   Sec'y Knox's statement that there

                                          would be imminent action in the

                                          Far East.

 *Oct. 28  N 6138  24125  Tokyo 674       Japanese nationals evacuating the

                                          N. E. I.

  Oct. 30    6175  24192  Wash. 1004      Talk with Adm. Pratt "Stark

                                          cannot de said to be a 'strong'

                                          individual, Admiral Pratt said.

                        NOVEMBER 1941



DATE       JD#     SIS#   OTHER           BRIEF



  Nov.  4  N 6238  24322  Tokyo 343       Japanese nationals evacuating the

                                          Philippine.

 *Nov.  4  A 6248  24330  Tokyo 725       Counter proposals will be given

                                          in #726 & 727. Conditions are so

                                          tense that no longer is procras-

                                          tination possible. This is our

                                          last effort The success or fail-

                                          ure of the pending discussions

                                          will have an immense effect on

                                          the destiny of the Empire of

                                          Japan.

 *Nov.  4  A 6249  24334  Tokyo 726       Proposal "A" Submitted in Part

                     to                   State Dept. on Nov. 7, 1941. "How

                   24337                  have we fought in China for four

                                          years. What tremendous sacrifices

                                          have we made. They must know this

                                          ... In any case, our internal

                                          situation also makes it impos-

                                          sible for us to make any further

                                          compromise."

  Nov.  4  A 6250  24338  Tokyo 727       Proposal "B" Never submitted. "A

                                          last effort to prevent something

                                          happening."

 #Nov.  4  A 6251  24339  Tokyo 730       "Ambassador Kurusu is leaving by

                                          clipper on the 7th.  He is car-

                                          rying no additional instruct-

                                          ions."

**Nov.  5  N 6254  24373  Tokyo 736       It is absolutely necessary that

                                          all arrangements for the signing

                                          of this agreement be completed by

                                          the 25th of this month. (Of ut-

                                          most secrecy.)

 #Nov.  6  A 6302  24439  Tokyo 739       We are sending Ambassador Kurusu

                                          to show our Empire's

                                          *sincerety...To make it sound

                                          good* we are telling the

                                          public... Both the Army and Navy

                                          are pleased. (Note: See JD

                                          #6017.)

  Nov.  7  N 6320  24479  Wash. 1040      There is danger that America will

                                          see through our condition.  If we

                                          have made up our minds to a final

                                          course of action it would be the

                                          part of wisdom to keep still

                                          about it.

  Nov.  8  N 6335  24533  Manila 722      Spy report on U.S. aircraft in

                                          the Philippines and analysis.

  Nov. 12  N ____  _____  _____________   "Dissemination to White House."

                                          (This memorandum in Kramer's

                                          handwriting records reasons for

                                          giving original translations to

                                          Pres. Roosevelt (& Sec'y Hull)

                                          after Nov. 12, 1941. Prior to

                                          that time Memoranda forwarding

                                          Paraphrases of important messages

                                          had been furnished.)

 *Nov. 12  N 6415  24373  Tokyo 762       The United States is still not

                                          full aware of the situation here.

                                          The  date set in message #736 is

                                          a definite deadline. The situa-

                                          tion is nearing a climax ... time

                                          is indeed becoming short.

 #Nov. 12  N 6416  24654  Tokyo 763       Germany putting pressure on Japan

                                          to get tough with the U.S.

 *Nov. 17  A 6541  24854  Hsinking #2     Manchukuo-Soviet Relations. (It

                          (Appended to    would impossible for us to fight

                            #1)           the Soviet Union unless something

                                          unforeseen happens.  The Kwantung

                                          military command is restraining

                                          the forces there from any rash

                                          action. The Soviet is also endea-

                                          voring not to antagonize our

                                          country.



**Nov. 17  A 6553  24877  Wash. 1090      Nomura's swan song. (Nov. 14,

    &  22.         24857                  1941.) The policy of the Ameri-

                     &                    can Govt. in the Pacific is to

                   25139                  stop any northward. They are

                                          contriving by every possible

                                          means to prepare for actual

                                          warfare.

  Nov. 17  A 6638  24878  Tokyo           Reply to Nomura. (The fate of our

                                          Empire hangs by a slender thread

                                          of a few days. I set the deadline.

                                          There will be no change.)



DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF



 *Nov. 22  A 6710  25138  Tokyo 812       There are reasons beyond your

                                          ability to guess why we wanted to

                                          settle Japanese-American

                                          relations by the 25th, but if the

                                          signing can be completed by *the

                                          29th, we have decided to wait

                                          until that date*. This time we

                                          mean it that the deadline abso-

                                          lutely cannot be changed. *After

                                          that things are automatically

                                          going to happen*.

  Nov. 26  A 6801  25322  Tokyo 2319      Should negotiations collapse...we

                                          will completely destroy British

                                          and American power in China. Keep

                                          absolutely quiet the existence of

                                          these decisions. (Circular to

                                          China Net-Nov. 14, 1941.)

 #Nov. 26  A 6841  25344  Tokyo 836       Telephone Code (see JD 6890)

  Nov. 26  N 6850  25392  Tokyo 2354      Winds Code -Morse (Nov. 19, 1941-

                                          J19).

 *Nov. 28  N 6875  25432  Tokyo 2353      Winds Code -Voice (Nov. 19, 1941-

                          Appended to     J19).

                          JD 6875         (Singapore version of the Winds

                                          Code. (N. E. I. (Thorpe) version

                                          of the Winds Code. (N. E. I.

                                          (Foote) version of the Winds Code.

                                          Japan-U. S.=East Wind Rain.

                                          Japan-U. S. S. R.=North Wind

                                                Cloudy.

                                          Japan-British=West Wind Clear

                                               (including N. E. I.).

  Nov. 28  N 6890  25443 ______________   Washington-Tokyo Telephone Con-

                                          versation Nov. 27, 1941 (2327-

                                          2334 EST)-The South, southward

                                          matter. A crisis does appear

                                          imminent. Regarding negotiations

                                          do not break them off. We have a

                                          crisis on hand and the Army is

                                          champing at the bit (See JD 6841.)

 #Nov. 26  A 6891  25435  Wash. 1180      Our failure and humiliation are

             6869  25436   "     "        complete.

 #Nov. 28  A 6898  25445  Tokyo 844       The United States has gone ahead

                                          and presented this humiliating

                                          proposal (of Nov. 26th). Negoti-

                                          ations will be de facto ruptured.

                                          Do not give the impression that

                                          negotiations are broken off.

  Nov. 30  N 6921  25496  Tokyo 857       Make one more attempt. Please be

                                          careful that this does not lead

                                          to anything like a breaking off

                                          of negotiations.



                           DECEMBER 1941



 #Dec.  1  N 6939  25545  Tokyo 2436      Destroying codes with chemicals.

 *Dec.  1  N 6942  25556  Berlin 1393     Ribbentrop said  "It is essential

                                          that Japan effect the New Order

                                          in East Asia without losing this

                                          opportunity." "Should Japan

                                          become engaged in a war against

                                          the U. S.  Germany, of, course,

                                          would join the war immediately."

                                          Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

                                          requested that the contents of

                                          our talks be kept a strict

                                          secret.

**Dec.  1  A 6943  25552  Tokyo 985       The conversation between Tokyo

                   25553                  and Washington now stand rup-

                                          tured-broken. Say *very secretly*

                                          to Hitler and Ribbentrop that

                                          there is extreme danger that war

                                          may suddenly break out between

                                          the Anglo-Saxon nations and

                                          Japan, and this war may come

                                          quicker than anyone dreams. Will

                                          not relax our pressure on the

                                          Soviet, but for the time being we

                                          would prefer to refrain from any

                                          direct moves in the north.

                                          (Nov. 30, 1941.)]

                                          Note: Coded message forwarded by

                                          Com 16 as GYROF 010001, 010014,

                                          or 010027.

                                          Also forwarded from London as

                                          Admiralty #104 and #105. Admir-

                                          alty advised "Tokyo to

                                          Berlin #985 of immediate interest

                                          to].



DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER          BRIEF



 *Dec.  1  A 6944  25554   Tokyo 986      The Imperial Govt. can no longer

                   25555    "     "       continue negotiations with the U.

                                          S. The proposal presented by the

                                          U. S. On the 26th contains one

                                          insulting clause. It is clearly a

                                          trick. *The U.S. has decided to

                                          regard Japan as an enemy*. (Nov.

                                          30, 1941.)

  Dec.  2  A 6974  25572  Hsinking 781    In the event that war break out

                                          with England and the U.S. persons

                                          to be interned: (a) British nat-

                                          ionals, 339; (b) American citi-

                                          zens, 81; (d) Nationals of the

                                          Soviet observed to be obnoxious

                                          characters with pro-British and

                                          American leanings are to be

                                          suitably taken care of.

 *Dec.  1  N 6983  25605  Tokyo 865       To prevent the U.S. from becoming

                                          unduly suspicious we have been

                                          advising the press and others

                                          that the negotiations are con-

                                          tinuing. The above is for only

                                          your information. (GY Log #6428.)

**Dec.  1  N 6984  25606  Tokyo 2444      The four offices in London, Hong

                                          Kong. Singapore, and Manila have

                                          been instructed to abandon the

                                          use of the code machines and to

                                          dispose of them.  The machine in

                                          Batavia has been returned to

                                          Japan. (GY Log #6432.)

 *Dec.  2  N 6985  25609  Tokyo 2409      Hidden Word Code (Nov. 27, 1941-

                                          J19).

  Dec.  3  N 6991  25644  Tokyo 111       Make your "ships in harbor"

                                          report irregular but twice a

                                          week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19).

**Dec.  4  N 7001                         JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to

                                          be the (missing) translation of

                                          the Winds Message.

 *Dec.  3  A 7017  25640  Tokyo 867       Washington burn all codes except

                                          one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and

                                          "L" (LA). Stop using the code

                                          machine and destroy it com-

                                          pletely when you have finished

                                          this, wire back "HARUNA."

                                          Destroy all messages files and

                                          other secret documents. (Dec. 2,

                                          1941.)

 #Dec.  4  A 7029  25694  Tokyo 114       Investigate fleet air bases in

                             or 111       Hawaii (Nov. 20, 1941-J19.)

 #Dec.  5  A 7063  25773  Tokyo 113       Report ships in Pearl Harbor,

                                          Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941 -

                                          J19.)

 #Dec.  5  A 7064  25772  Honolulu 224    Spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941)

 *Dec.  5  N 7086  25823  Tokyo 122       In the future report even when

                                          there are no (ship) movements

                                           (Nov 29, 1941-J19.)

 #Dec.  5  N 7091  25787  Tokyo 2443      London discontinue use of code

                                          machine and dispose of it immed-

                                          iately. (Dec. 1)

 **Dec.  4  N 7092  25783  Tokyo 893      Manchuria will take the same

                                          steps toward England and America

                                          that this country will take in

                                          case war breaks out. American and

                                          British consular officials and

                                          offices will not be recognized as

                                          having special rights. Great care

                                          shall be exercised not to antag-

                                          onize Russia. (Dec. 1st.) [Note:

                                          Intercepted by Army at Fort

                                          Shafter, T. H. Received by Navy

                                          in late afternoon of Dec. 3,

                                          1941, LCT. (GY Log #6498.)]



DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF



 #Dec.  6  A 7111  25817   Honolulu 222   Spy report on Naval vessels in

                                          Pearl Harbor. (Nov. 18, 1941-

                                          J19.)

**Dec.  6  N 7143  25843  Tokyo 902       Japanese Declaration of War.

   (1-13)                                 (Parts 1-13.)  (See GY Log #6619,

                                          6620, etc.)

**Dec.  7  N 7143  25843  Tokyo 902.      Japanese Declaration of War (Part

   (14)                                   14.) (Very Important.)

**Dec.  7  A 7145  25850  Tokyo 907       Re My #902-Submit our reply to

                                          the U. S. Govt. at 1:00 p. m. on

                                          the 7th your time. (Urgent-Very

                                          important.)

 *Dec.  7  A 7147  25854  Tokyo 910       After deciphering Part 14 of my

                                          902 and also 907, 908, and 909,

                                          destroy at once the remaining

                                          cipher machine. (Extremely

                                          Urgent)

**Dec.  7  N 7148  25856  Tokyo 2494      Relations between Japan and

                                          England are on the brink of

                                          catastophe (In Hidden

                                          Word Code.) (See JD #6985.)

 *Dec. 10  N 7280  26029  Honolulu 252    The following ships were in port

                                          on the afternoon of the fifth: 8

                                          battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16

                                          destroyers. Four ships of the

                                          Honolulu class were in dock.

                                          (Dec. 5th-PAK2.) [Note: Army

                                          intercept forwarded (by mail?)

                                          from San Francisco.]



 DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER          BRIEF



  Dec. 11  N 7335  26108   Pek. 625       Coincident with the beginning of

                                          the war against Britain and

                                          America (*Dec. 5th*). [NOTE:

                                          Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.

                                          Received Dec. 10 1941-see GY Log

                                          #6749.]

 *Dec.  8  A 7178  25877   Honolulu 253   There is considerable opportunity

                                          left to take advantage for a

                                          *surprise* attack against these

                                          places. (Dec. 6th-PAK2.) Army

                                          intercept forwarded by teletype

                                          from San Francisco.]

 *Dec.  8  A 7179  25874   Honolulu 254   It appears that no air recon-

                                          naissanee is being conducted by

                                          the fleet air arm. (Dec. 6th-

                                          PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded

                                          by teletype from San Francisco.]

**Dec.  7  A 7184  25866   Budapest 104   On the 6th the American Minister

                                          presented to the Government of

                                          this country a British Govern-

                                          ment communique to the effect that

                                          a state of war would break out on

                                          the 7th. (LA).

 #Dec.  8  A 7212  25928   Honolulu 238   Honolulu spy report. (Nov. 28 -J19.)

 *Dec. 12  A 7381  26158   Tokyo 128      Honolulu wire immediately move-

                                          ments of the fleet subsequent to

                                          the 4th. (Dec. 6-PAK2) [Note:

                                          Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.]



DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF



**Dec. 30  A 8007  27065  Tokyo 123       To Honolulu: In view of the

                                          present situation, *the presence

                                          in port of warships, airplane

                                          carriers, and cruisers is of

                                          utmost importance*. Let me know

                                          day by day. Wire me in each case

                                          whether or not there are any

                                          observation balloons above

                                          Pearl Harbor. Also whether or not

                                          the warships are provided with

                                          anti-mine nets. (Dec. 2-J19)

                                          [Note: Intercepted at Fort

                                          Shafter, T. H. Reason for long

                                          delay not known, but apparently

                                          some one fumbled the ball. Note

                                          on translation says: "This mes-

                                          sage was received here Dec. 23."]






http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/magic.html



THE PEARL HARBOR DECEPTION - The Bones of Station H


One week before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a US Navy listening post on the other side of Oahu intercepted Admiral Yamamoto's message to the AJapanese fleet to sail to Hawaii. Today, the remains of that radio station can still be seen.





Read more: whatreallyhappened.com http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/bones-station-h-0

Fall 1941: Pearl Harbor and The Wars of Corporate America

Myth: The US was forced to declare war on Japan after a totally unexpected Japanese attack on the American naval base in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. On account of Japan’s alliance with Nazi Germany, this aggression automatically brought the US into the war against Germany.
Reality: The Roosevelt administration had been eager for some time to wage war against Japan and sought to unleash such a war by means of the institution of an oil embargo and other provocations. Having deciphered Japanese codes, Washington knew a Japanese fleet was on its way to Pearl Harbor, but welcomed the attack since a Japanese aggression would make it possible to “sell” the war to the overwhelmingly anti-war American public.

Read more: whatreallyhappened.com http://whatreallyhappened.com/node/371782#ixzz3UYnoDXsG

Pearl Harbor Roosevelt's 911



Up until then, however, Americans had overwhelmingly opposed involvement in World War II. They had been thoroughly disillusioned by the First World War:
although they had been told they would be fighting for “democracy” in that previous war, taxpayers learned from the postwar Graham Committee of Congress that they’d been defrauded out of some $6 billion in armaments that were never manufactured or delivered1;
atrocity tales about German soldiers (such as cutting the hands off thousands of Belgian children) had turned out to be fabrications;
the sinking of the Lusitania – the central provocation that ultimately led to the U.S. declaration of war – had been committed by Germany not to kill women and children (as propaganda claimed), but to prevent tens of tons of war munitions from reaching the European front. (Click here for a debunking of the Lusitania myth.)