- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/warnings.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/ARTICLE5/
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/lieofthecentury.php#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/flynnfs.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/life-magazine-1945-pearl-harbor-inside-job#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/pearl-harbormother-all-conspiracies#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/book.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/SH.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/comatph.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/fdrknew.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/overview.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/govknow.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/So%20You%20Think%20Military%20Intervention%20is%20a%20Good%20Idea.pdf
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/wtc7_cnn_collapsed.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/lieofthecentury_italian.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/POLITICS/COINTELPRO/cointelpro.php#axzz3URKqfnAn
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- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/fakealqaeda.php#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/mccollum-memo-smoking-gun-pearl-harbor#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/mccollum-memo-smoking-gun-pearl-harbor#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/pearl-harbor-mother-all-conspiracies#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/HAWAII/hawaii.php#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/HAWAII/hawaii.php#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/warren-buffett-says-us-economic-pearl-harbor#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/publishers-weekly-selects-new-pearl-harbor-revisited-their-pick-week#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/911-truth-gore-vidal-recommends-new-pearl-harbor#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/fdr-pearl-harbor-conspiracy#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/pearl-harbor-mother-all-conspiracies-4#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/marshall.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/index.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/node/375667#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/node/371781#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/fdr.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/PROPAGANDA_IN_THE_NEXT_WAR_FOREWORD.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/node/371873#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/james-perloff-pearl-harbor-roosevelt%E2%80%99s-911#axzz3URKqfnAn
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/911_reichstag.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/McCollum/index.html
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCollum_memo
- http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/on-this-day/September-October-08/On-this-Day--McCollum-Memo-Delivered.html
- http://rationalrevolution.net/war/fdr_provoked_the_japanese_attack.htm
Monday, March 16, 2015
Links
http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/foia.html
F.O.I.A. REQUEST TO NSA
Print and Send
Print and Send
NSA/CSS FOIA Office (N5P5)
National Security Agency
9800 Savage Road STE 6248
Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6248
Dear Sir:
This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
I request that a copy of the following pre-World War II documents
be released to the National Archives: all pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese
naval dispatches from October 1, 1940, through December 7, 1941, all
worksheets pertaining thereto, and all translations thereof.
In order to help to determine my status to assess fees, you should
know that I am an individual seeking information for personal use and
not for commercial use. I ask only that this information be released
to the National Archives immediately as part of operation OPENDOOR.
I request a waiver of all fees for this request. Disclosure of the
requested information is in the public interest because it is likely to
contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or
activities of the government and is not primarily in my commercial
interest. In addition to your commitment to open government expressed
by executive order 12958, there should be commitment to the truth.
Thank you for your consideration of my request.
Sincerely,
(s)_____________________
________________________
Street
________________________
City State
________________________
Date
Note: Mention if you are a veteran
You will get a reply something like this:
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE. MARYAND 20755-15000
Dear Sir,
This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of
12 May 1998 in which you ask that "the following pre-World War II documents
be released to the National Archives: all pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese naval
dispatches from October 1, 1940, through December 7, 1941, 11 worksheets
pertaining thereto, and al translations thereof."
The FOIA allows the public access to federal agency records, except to the
extent that such records are protected from disclosure by one of nine
exemptions. There is no provision of the FOIA which allows the public to
direct
the release of records to the National Archives. In accordance with the Dad
regulation, processing of your request is being held in abeyance pending a
response from you, within 30 days of the date of this letter, clarifying your
request.
Sincerely,
BARBARA PAISLEY
Chief
FOIA/PA Services
At that point, pick any order you care to from the Pre-PH Japanese Naval
Dispatches page and request the raw intercept, all 1941 translations and
worksheets pertaining to it. Say it is in JN-25 code and give the serial
number, date and time of the order, from whom to whom and copy its contents.
The Sacrifice of Bataan
 |
| Bataan & Corregidor |
The loss of the Philippines was the greatest defeat of the United States Army but it has not received the attention that such distinction deserves. How was it possible, with perfect knowledge of the enemy's plans and greatly superior forces, that the U.S. lost a strong defensive position?
There were four critical steps. (1) The U.S. bombers were sacrificed on the ground. (2) MacArthur prevented food, ammunition, gas and other supplies from being stored on Bataan. (3) The remaining U.S. airforces were sent away December 17 just as the main Japanese force approached in convoy without air-cover. (4) Forces had to be misplaced at Lingayen Gulf.
- On the morning of December 7 (December 8 local time), hours after Pearl Harbor, MacArthur prevented air commander General Brereton from bombing Formosa. Dougout Doug further gave three conflicting orders that kept the B-17s at Clark Field on the ground most of the morning - bomb up, bombs off, bomb up. The Japanese attack was delayed because of fog. At 11:20, at the same moment that radar at Nichols Field near Manila reported a large mass of enemy planes approaching Clark from 140 miles out, MacArthur gave his final bomb-up order. MacArthur had about one hour to warn Clark and Iba Fields of the coming Japanese air attack and he did not. Instead he issued "Field Order Number One: Attack South Formosa at the latest daylight hour that visibility will permit." This order, time-stamped 11:20 A.M. but delivered at 11:45, is the one that kept the bombers on the ground at the critical moment. The bombers had to bomb up, be serviced and the crews rested for the late afternoon flight. This was the order that lost our airforce, given with full and complete knowledge that a large flight of Japanese bombers were coming in. MacArthur in his autobiography admits that "at 11:45 a report came in of an overpowering enemy formation closing in on Clark Field." *1 At 11:56 Brereton had to give a full report to MacArthur's Chief of Staff General Sutherland by phone, a way to keep both Brereton and the single phone line tied up in the critical few moments before the attack (note that Sutherland could have warned Brereton of the radar report but did not). MacArthur could control the teletype and radio but there was a danger that spotters would telephone Clark Field and warn them of the approaching planes.
- MacArthur said he was going to fight on the "beaches, beaches,
beaches," but this plan which is sometimes attributed to MacArthur
actually was imposed on him on 18 October 1941 by General Marshall.
The plan to fight on the beaches was preposterous in October but after
the Navy left and the air forces were knocked out on December 8, it was
suicide. On December 8, MacArthur told his Chief of Staff General
Sutherland they would have to "remove immediately to Bataan." He told
the same thing to Quezon four days later. *2 President Quezon also spoke
against the plan to fight on the beaches. In the two weeks prior to the
main Japanese invasion, MacArthur, knowing that he would have to
retreat to Bataan and told this also by General Wainwright and President
Quezon, refused to move supplies there. The Orange and Rainbow war
plans since 1909 had included plans to move supplies to Bataan - that
had been changed by Marshall on 18 October 1941. This change of defense
to a plan of defending all beaches against superior forces, was not just
nonsense on its face, but a deliberate sacrifice of all U.S. troops in
the Philippines and of the Philippines themselves. Even on its own terms
it was no plan at all. It was smoke to cover the sacrifice of the
Philippines. The plan required a very large concentration of U.S.
warships to defend the Philippines and Washington had ordered the
Pacific fleet south, indicating that there was no plan to defend the
beaches. The plan required air superiority which had been lost the first
day. Early on the Japanese invaded both in the north and in the south -
December 10 at Apparri and Vigan and December 12 at Legaspi. MacArthur
did not even attempt to repel them, proving the "beaches" plan was a
farce. That slogan was simply a ruse to prevent the supplying of Bataan.
When the Japanese landed at Lingayen, MacArthur abandoned the beaches
plan within two days. Some strategy! MacArthur also wouldn't invoke the
Orange plan WPO-3 until December 24th after the Japanese had landed in
force at 9 points. He lost 500,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and
3,400,000 gallons of oil and gasoline plus food, clothing and medicines
on the beaches. At the single depot at Cabanatuan, he left fifty million
bushels of rice, enough to feed all the troops on Bataan for four
years. Just 70 miles from Bataan quartermasters found 2000 cases of
canned fish but were ordered directly and repeatedly by MacArthur's
headquarters to abandon them or face court-martial. Besides not
supplying Bataan, MacArthur went to extraordinary lengths to make sure
no food was taken there. He deliberately starved his men. *3
On 24 January 1942, Bataan was ordered to send food to the already
well-stocked Corregidor which had a six-months supply for 10,000 men.
The men on Bataan were starving. This order was to further reduce them.
*4
On February 23rd FDR made a radio address to the troops on Bataan to discourage them and inform that they would receive no relief. While Soviet Communists were being rushed billions of dollars of supplies, nothing, not even food, could be spared our men on Bataan. They were left to starve and rot. This is in stark contrast to what happened on Guadalcanal just a few months later. There submarines and fast destroyers supplied our forces and even tankers full of gasoline were sent in and grounded so the troops could be well stocked. It would have been easy to break the "paper blockade", as MacArthur called it, around the Philippines especially since we were reading the Japanese fleet code and could avoid interception. Not only submarines could have supplied Bataan, and the Asiatic Fleet stationed at Manila had the largest submarine force in the U.S. Navy, but large supply ships could have stood off in the south islands and fast coast-runners could have brought the supplies to Bataan at night. MacArthur wrote, "Since the blockade was lightly held, many medium-sized ships could have been loaded with supplies and dispatched along various routes. It seemed incredible to me that no effort was made to bring in supplies." Japanese records show that commanding General Homma, who had about half as many troops as MacArthur, was ready to give up: "If only help could have reached the Philippines, even in small form, if only limited reinforcement could have been supplied, the end could not have failed to be a success." (It is incongruous for MacArthur to complain about lack of supplies when he was responsible.) Obviously, since ships were frequently sent out from Corregidor and Bataan in the spring of 1942, MacArthur himself leaving with a flotilla of PT boats on March 11, ships could have equally well have been sent in. However, saving the 31,095 Americans on Bataan was not going to happen - it was the last thing Roosevelt wanted. Some clue to his thinking was his suggestion of surrender to MacArthur rather early on in February, "I authorize you to arrange for the capitulation of the Filipino elements of the defending forces..." This discloses intent. This was at a time when President Quezon controlled seventy-five percent of his country, the Japanese really only controlled the cities and the Japanese general was ready to give up. MacArthur did not think it was a good idea partly because Roosevelt, in typical fashion, had worded his letter so that MacArthur would take the blame. *5
- The Japanese main invasion on December 22 at Lingayen Gulf consisted
of three transport echelons. "The first was composed of twenty-seven
transports from Takio under the command of Rear Admiral Kensaburo Hara,
the second of twenty-eight transports from Mako under Rear Admiral Yoji
Nishimura, the third of twenty-one transports from Keeling under Rear
Admiral Sueto Hirose." This force of seventy-six transports carried the
main part of Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma's 80,000 strong
Fourteenth Army. MacArthur correctly predicted the landing site long in
advance, probably through decoded JN-25B messages. Homma's transports
were surprisingly given no air support or cover whatever. *6
With perfect timing, Washington ordered all bombers to Australia on
December 17th just as the invasion forces embarked. It was vital to
prevent the American bombers from wreaking havoc on this invasion force
when in their vulnerable transports. As it was, the Philippine Army
greatly outnumbered the Japanese and there was danger of strong
resistance, particularly in light of the marked inferior quality of
Japanese artillery and tanks. To give some idea of the devastation that
heavy strategic bombers would have caused to the Japanese transports,
MacArthur mentions that of the twelve transports that approached the
Philippines on December 10 (after Clark had been wiped out), four were
sunk and three damaged. The horrific slaughter our bombers would have
wreaked on defenseless transports is almost unimaginable. The invasion
would have been a total debacle.
- MacArthur, armed with perfect intelligence of enemy intentions from codebreaking, had from December 8 to December 22 to place his troops. He misplaced his troops at the head of Lingayen Gulf and left the obvious landing zone of the 120 mile Eastern Shore lightly defended by two Filipino divisions, one of which had no artillery. Fortunately for the Japanese, when they landed they were unopposed because the Japanese landing ships foundered horribly in the surf and it took them a long time with extreme difficulty to get their men and especially tanks and artillery ashore. When the Japanese landed, MacArthur demonstrated how hollow and false the "defend the beaches" joke was and immediately ordered the retreat to Bataan on December 24.
CONCLUSION
The destruction of MacArthur's air forces on the ground after nine hours warning and direct orders to bomb Formosa was the greatest blunder the history of war and his loss of the Philippines was the greatest defeat of the U.S. Army. It is remarkable how MacArthur escaped any reprimand, kept his command and got his fourth star on December 17th and a Congressional Medal of Honor for "gallantry and intrepidity" at Bataan where he spent part of only one day, 10 January 1942, on inspection. He was awarded the medal after he had already fled and deserted his troops. His ultimate reward was orders to leave the Philippines with his family while his soldiers were subjected to the deadly brutality of the Bataan Death March. The defense of the Philippines cannot be understood in terms of conventional military strategy. In those terms it was one incomprehensible blunder after another, done with due deliberation and afterward profusely rewarded. Just as Clauswitz said war is politics by other means, the sacrifice of the Philippines can only be understood in the larger political context. Analysis of local decisions by MacArthur, miss the point that FDR was actually calling the shots. His motivations, not MacArthur's are at issue. The sacrifice of the 31,095 Americans and 80 thousand Filipino troops with 26 thousand refugees on Bataan is a separate issue from the sacrifice of the Army Air Corps at Clark and Iba.The bombers were sacrificed, not only to facilitate the loss of the Philippines, but more immediately to sucker Hitler into declaring war on the United States and events in the Philippines are analogous to Pearl Harbor which happened the same day. However, Hitler did declare war on December 11th and therefore obviously the sacrifice of Bataan proper springs from other motives. To understand Roosevelt's strategy we have to ask a very basic question: Cui bono? "Who benefits?" Who benefited from Japan's temporary ascendancy and the war dragging on? It was obvious that when the Japanese Empire collapsed that there would be a power vacuum in Asia. The ultimate question of the Pacific War was who would fill that vacuum. Who would take China? Roosevelt wanted Russia to fill the vacuum (cf. his actions at Yalta and How the Far East Was Lost, Dr. Anthony Kubek, 1963) and therefore had to prolong the war so the Soviet Union could pick up the pieces. Because the Soviet Union had its hands full fighting Germany and could not dominate Asia until the war in Europe was under control, delay in the defeat of Japan was necessary. Bataan was a pawn in a larger game. The Battling Bastards of Bataan never understood enough to ask the critical question - "who was their real enemy?" It was Franklin Roosevelt.
The orders to fight on all beaches and not supply Bataan were nothing less than the deliberate sacrifice of 31,095 Americans.
References
1 Reminiscences, Douglas MacArthur, p 117. 2 "remove immediately", Philippines the Continuing Past, R. and L. Constantino, page 46. 3 American Ceasar, William Manchester, knew he had to go to Bataan, p 196; Cabantuan, ibid, p 215; war plans ibid p 194; January 10, ibid, p 235; Supplies lost, 4th star, Blood, Tears and Folly, Len Deighton, pp 570, 571; fish, Our Last Ditch, John Whitman, 1990. pp 46-47. 4 The Continuing Past, R. and L. Constantino, p 46. 5 Reminiscences, MacArthur, p 133, 128; Guadalcanal contrast, Oil and War, Robert Goralski and Russell Freeburg, p 157; FDR to MacArthur, Reminiscences, p 139. 6 No air cover - Fall of the Philippines, Louis Morton, 1953, official Army History, p 128.
Pre Pearl Harbor Japanese Diplomatic Intercepts
PRE-PEARL HARBOR
JAPANESE
DIPLOMATIC INTERCEPTS
MAGIC
JULY 1941
#July 7 A ____ _____ I. B. 1-155 "The Jap Govt."do not at present
feel compelled to modify their
policy towards the USSR." (JD
3461)
*July 24 N ____ _____ ___________ Memo to Naval Aide to the
President re withdrawal of Jap
merchant vessels from the
Atlantic Ocean.
AUGUST 1941
*Aug. 4 N ____ _____ GZ-1 Jap Decisions at Imperial
Conference, July 2, 1941"to break
British-American encirclement and
arm for all-out war.
#Aug. 9 N ____ _____ GZ-4 Preparation for the southward
advance shall be reinforced.
OCTOBER 1941
#Oct. 8 A 5693 23220 Tokyo 647 The internal situation here"would
not permit further delay.
Oct. 9 A 5696 23260 Tokyo #83 Area designations in Pearl Harbor
(for spy reports).
Oct. 10 N 5730 23312 Honolulu #41 Dock & Mooring designations in
Pearl Harbor (for spy reports).
#Oct. 10 N 5738 23318 Harbin 129 Promise of American aid
to Russia.
#Oct. 13 N 5779 23421 Tokyo 658 "The situation at home is fast
approaching a crisis."
#Oct. 13 N ____ _____ GZ-9 Crisis in Japan (see JD 5779).
Oct. 17 N 5898 23629 Rome 661 Evacuation of Japanese merchants
from Europe.
Oct. 18 N 5923 23677 Tokyo 682 Resignation of Jap cabinet.
Oct. 23 A 6017 23859 Wash. Nomura submits his resignation. "I
don't want to continue this hypo-
critical existence deceiving
other people . . . As a man of
honor this is the only way open to
me." (This is why Kurusu was
sent.)
Oct. 27 A 6084 23996 Wash. 989 "The Chief of Staff has sent the
Military Attache some secret
advice. Is this the future policy
of the Government."
Oct. 26 N 6118 24070 Mex. City 422 Sec'y Knox's statement that there
would be imminent action in the
Far East.
*Oct. 28 N 6138 24125 Tokyo 674 Japanese nationals evacuating the
N. E. I.
Oct. 30 6175 24192 Wash. 1004 Talk with Adm. Pratt "Stark
cannot de said to be a 'strong'
individual, Admiral Pratt said.
NOVEMBER 1941
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
Nov. 4 N 6238 24322 Tokyo 343 Japanese nationals evacuating the
Philippine.
*Nov. 4 A 6248 24330 Tokyo 725 Counter proposals will be given
in #726 & 727. Conditions are so
tense that no longer is procras-
tination possible. This is our
last effort The success or fail-
ure of the pending discussions
will have an immense effect on
the destiny of the Empire of
Japan.
*Nov. 4 A 6249 24334 Tokyo 726 Proposal "A" Submitted in Part
to State Dept. on Nov. 7, 1941. "How
24337 have we fought in China for four
years. What tremendous sacrifices
have we made. They must know this
... In any case, our internal
situation also makes it impos-
sible for us to make any further
compromise."
Nov. 4 A 6250 24338 Tokyo 727 Proposal "B" Never submitted. "A
last effort to prevent something
happening."
#Nov. 4 A 6251 24339 Tokyo 730 "Ambassador Kurusu is leaving by
clipper on the 7th. He is car-
rying no additional instruct-
ions."
**Nov. 5 N 6254 24373 Tokyo 736 It is absolutely necessary that
all arrangements for the signing
of this agreement be completed by
the 25th of this month. (Of ut-
most secrecy.)
#Nov. 6 A 6302 24439 Tokyo 739 We are sending Ambassador Kurusu
to show our Empire's
*sincerety...To make it sound
good* we are telling the
public... Both the Army and Navy
are pleased. (Note: See JD
#6017.)
Nov. 7 N 6320 24479 Wash. 1040 There is danger that America will
see through our condition. If we
have made up our minds to a final
course of action it would be the
part of wisdom to keep still
about it.
Nov. 8 N 6335 24533 Manila 722 Spy report on U.S. aircraft in
the Philippines and analysis.
Nov. 12 N ____ _____ _____________ "Dissemination to White House."
(This memorandum in Kramer's
handwriting records reasons for
giving original translations to
Pres. Roosevelt (& Sec'y Hull)
after Nov. 12, 1941. Prior to
that time Memoranda forwarding
Paraphrases of important messages
had been furnished.)
*Nov. 12 N 6415 24373 Tokyo 762 The United States is still not
full aware of the situation here.
The date set in message #736 is
a definite deadline. The situa-
tion is nearing a climax ... time
is indeed becoming short.
#Nov. 12 N 6416 24654 Tokyo 763 Germany putting pressure on Japan
to get tough with the U.S.
*Nov. 17 A 6541 24854 Hsinking #2 Manchukuo-Soviet Relations. (It
(Appended to would impossible for us to fight
#1) the Soviet Union unless something
unforeseen happens. The Kwantung
military command is restraining
the forces there from any rash
action. The Soviet is also endea-
voring not to antagonize our
country.
**Nov. 17 A 6553 24877 Wash. 1090 Nomura's swan song. (Nov. 14,
& 22. 24857 1941.) The policy of the Ameri-
& can Govt. in the Pacific is to
25139 stop any northward. They are
contriving by every possible
means to prepare for actual
warfare.
Nov. 17 A 6638 24878 Tokyo Reply to Nomura. (The fate of our
Empire hangs by a slender thread
of a few days. I set the deadline.
There will be no change.)
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
*Nov. 22 A 6710 25138 Tokyo 812 There are reasons beyond your
ability to guess why we wanted to
settle Japanese-American
relations by the 25th, but if the
signing can be completed by *the
29th, we have decided to wait
until that date*. This time we
mean it that the deadline abso-
lutely cannot be changed. *After
that things are automatically
going to happen*.
Nov. 26 A 6801 25322 Tokyo 2319 Should negotiations collapse...we
will completely destroy British
and American power in China. Keep
absolutely quiet the existence of
these decisions. (Circular to
China Net-Nov. 14, 1941.)
#Nov. 26 A 6841 25344 Tokyo 836 Telephone Code (see JD 6890)
Nov. 26 N 6850 25392 Tokyo 2354 Winds Code -Morse (Nov. 19, 1941-
J19).
*Nov. 28 N 6875 25432 Tokyo 2353 Winds Code -Voice (Nov. 19, 1941-
Appended to J19).
JD 6875 (Singapore version of the Winds
Code. (N. E. I. (Thorpe) version
of the Winds Code. (N. E. I.
(Foote) version of the Winds Code.
Japan-U. S.=East Wind Rain.
Japan-U. S. S. R.=North Wind
Cloudy.
Japan-British=West Wind Clear
(including N. E. I.).
Nov. 28 N 6890 25443 ______________ Washington-Tokyo Telephone Con-
versation Nov. 27, 1941 (2327-
2334 EST)-The South, southward
matter. A crisis does appear
imminent. Regarding negotiations
do not break them off. We have a
crisis on hand and the Army is
champing at the bit (See JD 6841.)
#Nov. 26 A 6891 25435 Wash. 1180 Our failure and humiliation are
6869 25436 " " complete.
#Nov. 28 A 6898 25445 Tokyo 844 The United States has gone ahead
and presented this humiliating
proposal (of Nov. 26th). Negoti-
ations will be de facto ruptured.
Do not give the impression that
negotiations are broken off.
Nov. 30 N 6921 25496 Tokyo 857 Make one more attempt. Please be
careful that this does not lead
to anything like a breaking off
of negotiations.
DECEMBER 1941
#Dec. 1 N 6939 25545 Tokyo 2436 Destroying codes with chemicals.
*Dec. 1 N 6942 25556 Berlin 1393 Ribbentrop said "It is essential
that Japan effect the New Order
in East Asia without losing this
opportunity." "Should Japan
become engaged in a war against
the U. S. Germany, of, course,
would join the war immediately."
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
requested that the contents of
our talks be kept a strict
secret.
**Dec. 1 A 6943 25552 Tokyo 985 The conversation between Tokyo
25553 and Washington now stand rup-
tured-broken. Say *very secretly*
to Hitler and Ribbentrop that
there is extreme danger that war
may suddenly break out between
the Anglo-Saxon nations and
Japan, and this war may come
quicker than anyone dreams. Will
not relax our pressure on the
Soviet, but for the time being we
would prefer to refrain from any
direct moves in the north.
(Nov. 30, 1941.)]
Note: Coded message forwarded by
Com 16 as GYROF 010001, 010014,
or 010027.
Also forwarded from London as
Admiralty #104 and #105. Admir-
alty advised "Tokyo to
Berlin #985 of immediate interest
to].
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
*Dec. 1 A 6944 25554 Tokyo 986 The Imperial Govt. can no longer
25555 " " continue negotiations with the U.
S. The proposal presented by the
U. S. On the 26th contains one
insulting clause. It is clearly a
trick. *The U.S. has decided to
regard Japan as an enemy*. (Nov.
30, 1941.)
Dec. 2 A 6974 25572 Hsinking 781 In the event that war break out
with England and the U.S. persons
to be interned: (a) British nat-
ionals, 339; (b) American citi-
zens, 81; (d) Nationals of the
Soviet observed to be obnoxious
characters with pro-British and
American leanings are to be
suitably taken care of.
*Dec. 1 N 6983 25605 Tokyo 865 To prevent the U.S. from becoming
unduly suspicious we have been
advising the press and others
that the negotiations are con-
tinuing. The above is for only
your information. (GY Log #6428.)
**Dec. 1 N 6984 25606 Tokyo 2444 The four offices in London, Hong
Kong. Singapore, and Manila have
been instructed to abandon the
use of the code machines and to
dispose of them. The machine in
Batavia has been returned to
Japan. (GY Log #6432.)
*Dec. 2 N 6985 25609 Tokyo 2409 Hidden Word Code (Nov. 27, 1941-
J19).
Dec. 3 N 6991 25644 Tokyo 111 Make your "ships in harbor"
report irregular but twice a
week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19).
**Dec. 4 N 7001 JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to
be the (missing) translation of
the Winds Message.
*Dec. 3 A 7017 25640 Tokyo 867 Washington burn all codes except
one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and
"L" (LA). Stop using the code
machine and destroy it com-
pletely when you have finished
this, wire back "HARUNA."
Destroy all messages files and
other secret documents. (Dec. 2,
1941.)
#Dec. 4 A 7029 25694 Tokyo 114 Investigate fleet air bases in
or 111 Hawaii (Nov. 20, 1941-J19.)
#Dec. 5 A 7063 25773 Tokyo 113 Report ships in Pearl Harbor,
Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941 -
J19.)
#Dec. 5 A 7064 25772 Honolulu 224 Spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941)
*Dec. 5 N 7086 25823 Tokyo 122 In the future report even when
there are no (ship) movements
(Nov 29, 1941-J19.)
#Dec. 5 N 7091 25787 Tokyo 2443 London discontinue use of code
machine and dispose of it immed-
iately. (Dec. 1)
**Dec. 4 N 7092 25783 Tokyo 893 Manchuria will take the same
steps toward England and America
that this country will take in
case war breaks out. American and
British consular officials and
offices will not be recognized as
having special rights. Great care
shall be exercised not to antag-
onize Russia. (Dec. 1st.) [Note:
Intercepted by Army at Fort
Shafter, T. H. Received by Navy
in late afternoon of Dec. 3,
1941, LCT. (GY Log #6498.)]
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
#Dec. 6 A 7111 25817 Honolulu 222 Spy report on Naval vessels in
Pearl Harbor. (Nov. 18, 1941-
J19.)
**Dec. 6 N 7143 25843 Tokyo 902 Japanese Declaration of War.
(1-13) (Parts 1-13.) (See GY Log #6619,
6620, etc.)
**Dec. 7 N 7143 25843 Tokyo 902. Japanese Declaration of War (Part
(14) 14.) (Very Important.)
**Dec. 7 A 7145 25850 Tokyo 907 Re My #902-Submit our reply to
the U. S. Govt. at 1:00 p. m. on
the 7th your time. (Urgent-Very
important.)
*Dec. 7 A 7147 25854 Tokyo 910 After deciphering Part 14 of my
902 and also 907, 908, and 909,
destroy at once the remaining
cipher machine. (Extremely
Urgent)
**Dec. 7 N 7148 25856 Tokyo 2494 Relations between Japan and
England are on the brink of
catastophe (In Hidden
Word Code.) (See JD #6985.)
*Dec. 10 N 7280 26029 Honolulu 252 The following ships were in port
on the afternoon of the fifth: 8
battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16
destroyers. Four ships of the
Honolulu class were in dock.
(Dec. 5th-PAK2.) [Note: Army
intercept forwarded (by mail?)
from San Francisco.]
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
Dec. 11 N 7335 26108 Pek. 625 Coincident with the beginning of
the war against Britain and
America (*Dec. 5th*). [NOTE:
Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.
Received Dec. 10 1941-see GY Log
#6749.]
*Dec. 8 A 7178 25877 Honolulu 253 There is considerable opportunity
left to take advantage for a
*surprise* attack against these
places. (Dec. 6th-PAK2.) Army
intercept forwarded by teletype
from San Francisco.]
*Dec. 8 A 7179 25874 Honolulu 254 It appears that no air recon-
naissanee is being conducted by
the fleet air arm. (Dec. 6th-
PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded
by teletype from San Francisco.]
**Dec. 7 A 7184 25866 Budapest 104 On the 6th the American Minister
presented to the Government of
this country a British Govern-
ment communique to the effect that
a state of war would break out on
the 7th. (LA).
#Dec. 8 A 7212 25928 Honolulu 238 Honolulu spy report. (Nov. 28 -J19.)
*Dec. 12 A 7381 26158 Tokyo 128 Honolulu wire immediately move-
ments of the fleet subsequent to
the 4th. (Dec. 6-PAK2) [Note:
Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.]
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
**Dec. 30 A 8007 27065 Tokyo 123 To Honolulu: In view of the
present situation, *the presence
in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of
utmost importance*. Let me know
day by day. Wire me in each case
whether or not there are any
observation balloons above
Pearl Harbor. Also whether or not
the warships are provided with
anti-mine nets. (Dec. 2-J19)
[Note: Intercepted at Fort
Shafter, T. H. Reason for long
delay not known, but apparently
some one fumbled the ball. Note
on translation says: "This mes-
sage was received here Dec. 23."]
http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/magic.html
THE PEARL HARBOR DECEPTION - The Bones of Station H
One week before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a US Navy listening post on the other side of Oahu intercepted Admiral Yamamoto's message to the AJapanese fleet to sail to Hawaii. Today, the remains of that radio station can still be seen.
Read more: whatreallyhappened.com http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/bones-station-h-0
Fall 1941: Pearl Harbor and The Wars of Corporate America
Myth: The US was forced to declare war on Japan after a totally
unexpected Japanese attack on the American naval base in Hawaii on
December 7, 1941. On account of Japan’s alliance with Nazi Germany, this
aggression automatically brought the US into the war against Germany.
Reality: The Roosevelt administration had been eager for some time to wage war against Japan and sought to unleash such a war by means of the institution of an oil embargo and other provocations. Having deciphered Japanese codes, Washington knew a Japanese fleet was on its way to Pearl Harbor, but welcomed the attack since a Japanese aggression would make it possible to “sell” the war to the overwhelmingly anti-war American public.
Reality: The Roosevelt administration had been eager for some time to wage war against Japan and sought to unleash such a war by means of the institution of an oil embargo and other provocations. Having deciphered Japanese codes, Washington knew a Japanese fleet was on its way to Pearl Harbor, but welcomed the attack since a Japanese aggression would make it possible to “sell” the war to the overwhelmingly anti-war American public.
Read more: whatreallyhappened.com http://whatreallyhappened.com/node/371782#ixzz3UYnoDXsG
Pearl Harbor Roosevelt's 911
Up until then, however, Americans had overwhelmingly opposed involvement in World War II. They had been thoroughly disillusioned by the First World War:
although they had been told they would be fighting for “democracy” in that previous war, taxpayers learned from the postwar Graham Committee of Congress that they’d been defrauded out of some $6 billion in armaments that were never manufactured or delivered1;
atrocity tales about German soldiers (such as cutting the hands off thousands of Belgian children) had turned out to be fabrications;
the sinking of the Lusitania – the central provocation that ultimately led to the U.S. declaration of war – had been committed by Germany not to kill women and children (as propaganda claimed), but to prevent tens of tons of war munitions from reaching the European front. (Click here for a debunking of the Lusitania myth.)
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