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- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/marshall.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/index.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/node/375667#axzz3URKqfnAn
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- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/fdr.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/PROPAGANDA_IN_THE_NEXT_WAR_FOREWORD.html
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- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/911_reichstag.html
- http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/McCollum/index.html
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCollum_memo
- http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/on-this-day/September-October-08/On-this-Day--McCollum-Memo-Delivered.html
- http://rationalrevolution.net/war/fdr_provoked_the_japanese_attack.htm
Pearl Harbor 1941
Monday, March 16, 2015
Links
http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/foia.html
F.O.I.A. REQUEST TO NSA
Print and Send
Print and Send
NSA/CSS FOIA Office (N5P5) National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road STE 6248 Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6248 Dear Sir: This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act. I request that a copy of the following pre-World War II documents be released to the National Archives: all pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese naval dispatches from October 1, 1940, through December 7, 1941, all worksheets pertaining thereto, and all translations thereof. In order to help to determine my status to assess fees, you should know that I am an individual seeking information for personal use and not for commercial use. I ask only that this information be released to the National Archives immediately as part of operation OPENDOOR. I request a waiver of all fees for this request. Disclosure of the requested information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in my commercial interest. In addition to your commitment to open government expressed by executive order 12958, there should be commitment to the truth. Thank you for your consideration of my request. Sincerely, (s)_____________________ ________________________ Street ________________________ City State ________________________ Date Note: Mention if you are a veteran You will get a reply something like this: NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE. MARYAND 20755-15000 Dear Sir, This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 12 May 1998 in which you ask that "the following pre-World War II documents be released to the National Archives: all pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese naval dispatches from October 1, 1940, through December 7, 1941, 11 worksheets pertaining thereto, and al translations thereof." The FOIA allows the public access to federal agency records, except to the extent that such records are protected from disclosure by one of nine exemptions. There is no provision of the FOIA which allows the public to direct the release of records to the National Archives. In accordance with the Dad regulation, processing of your request is being held in abeyance pending a response from you, within 30 days of the date of this letter, clarifying your request. Sincerely, BARBARA PAISLEY Chief FOIA/PA Services At that point, pick any order you care to from the Pre-PH Japanese Naval Dispatches page and request the raw intercept, all 1941 translations and worksheets pertaining to it. Say it is in JN-25 code and give the serial number, date and time of the order, from whom to whom and copy its contents.
The Sacrifice of Bataan
Bataan & Corregidor |
The loss of the Philippines was the greatest defeat of the United States Army but it has not received the attention that such distinction deserves. How was it possible, with perfect knowledge of the enemy's plans and greatly superior forces, that the U.S. lost a strong defensive position?
There were four critical steps. (1) The U.S. bombers were sacrificed on the ground. (2) MacArthur prevented food, ammunition, gas and other supplies from being stored on Bataan. (3) The remaining U.S. airforces were sent away December 17 just as the main Japanese force approached in convoy without air-cover. (4) Forces had to be misplaced at Lingayen Gulf.
- On the morning of December 7 (December 8 local time), hours after Pearl Harbor, MacArthur prevented air commander General Brereton from bombing Formosa. Dougout Doug further gave three conflicting orders that kept the B-17s at Clark Field on the ground most of the morning - bomb up, bombs off, bomb up. The Japanese attack was delayed because of fog. At 11:20, at the same moment that radar at Nichols Field near Manila reported a large mass of enemy planes approaching Clark from 140 miles out, MacArthur gave his final bomb-up order. MacArthur had about one hour to warn Clark and Iba Fields of the coming Japanese air attack and he did not. Instead he issued "Field Order Number One: Attack South Formosa at the latest daylight hour that visibility will permit." This order, time-stamped 11:20 A.M. but delivered at 11:45, is the one that kept the bombers on the ground at the critical moment. The bombers had to bomb up, be serviced and the crews rested for the late afternoon flight. This was the order that lost our airforce, given with full and complete knowledge that a large flight of Japanese bombers were coming in. MacArthur in his autobiography admits that "at 11:45 a report came in of an overpowering enemy formation closing in on Clark Field." *1 At 11:56 Brereton had to give a full report to MacArthur's Chief of Staff General Sutherland by phone, a way to keep both Brereton and the single phone line tied up in the critical few moments before the attack (note that Sutherland could have warned Brereton of the radar report but did not). MacArthur could control the teletype and radio but there was a danger that spotters would telephone Clark Field and warn them of the approaching planes.
- MacArthur said he was going to fight on the "beaches, beaches,
beaches," but this plan which is sometimes attributed to MacArthur
actually was imposed on him on 18 October 1941 by General Marshall.
The plan to fight on the beaches was preposterous in October but after
the Navy left and the air forces were knocked out on December 8, it was
suicide. On December 8, MacArthur told his Chief of Staff General
Sutherland they would have to "remove immediately to Bataan." He told
the same thing to Quezon four days later. *2 President Quezon also spoke
against the plan to fight on the beaches. In the two weeks prior to the
main Japanese invasion, MacArthur, knowing that he would have to
retreat to Bataan and told this also by General Wainwright and President
Quezon, refused to move supplies there. The Orange and Rainbow war
plans since 1909 had included plans to move supplies to Bataan - that
had been changed by Marshall on 18 October 1941. This change of defense
to a plan of defending all beaches against superior forces, was not just
nonsense on its face, but a deliberate sacrifice of all U.S. troops in
the Philippines and of the Philippines themselves. Even on its own terms
it was no plan at all. It was smoke to cover the sacrifice of the
Philippines. The plan required a very large concentration of U.S.
warships to defend the Philippines and Washington had ordered the
Pacific fleet south, indicating that there was no plan to defend the
beaches. The plan required air superiority which had been lost the first
day. Early on the Japanese invaded both in the north and in the south -
December 10 at Apparri and Vigan and December 12 at Legaspi. MacArthur
did not even attempt to repel them, proving the "beaches" plan was a
farce. That slogan was simply a ruse to prevent the supplying of Bataan.
When the Japanese landed at Lingayen, MacArthur abandoned the beaches
plan within two days. Some strategy! MacArthur also wouldn't invoke the
Orange plan WPO-3 until December 24th after the Japanese had landed in
force at 9 points. He lost 500,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and
3,400,000 gallons of oil and gasoline plus food, clothing and medicines
on the beaches. At the single depot at Cabanatuan, he left fifty million
bushels of rice, enough to feed all the troops on Bataan for four
years. Just 70 miles from Bataan quartermasters found 2000 cases of
canned fish but were ordered directly and repeatedly by MacArthur's
headquarters to abandon them or face court-martial. Besides not
supplying Bataan, MacArthur went to extraordinary lengths to make sure
no food was taken there. He deliberately starved his men. *3
On 24 January 1942, Bataan was ordered to send food to the already
well-stocked Corregidor which had a six-months supply for 10,000 men.
The men on Bataan were starving. This order was to further reduce them.
*4
On February 23rd FDR made a radio address to the troops on Bataan to discourage them and inform that they would receive no relief. While Soviet Communists were being rushed billions of dollars of supplies, nothing, not even food, could be spared our men on Bataan. They were left to starve and rot. This is in stark contrast to what happened on Guadalcanal just a few months later. There submarines and fast destroyers supplied our forces and even tankers full of gasoline were sent in and grounded so the troops could be well stocked. It would have been easy to break the "paper blockade", as MacArthur called it, around the Philippines especially since we were reading the Japanese fleet code and could avoid interception. Not only submarines could have supplied Bataan, and the Asiatic Fleet stationed at Manila had the largest submarine force in the U.S. Navy, but large supply ships could have stood off in the south islands and fast coast-runners could have brought the supplies to Bataan at night. MacArthur wrote, "Since the blockade was lightly held, many medium-sized ships could have been loaded with supplies and dispatched along various routes. It seemed incredible to me that no effort was made to bring in supplies." Japanese records show that commanding General Homma, who had about half as many troops as MacArthur, was ready to give up: "If only help could have reached the Philippines, even in small form, if only limited reinforcement could have been supplied, the end could not have failed to be a success." (It is incongruous for MacArthur to complain about lack of supplies when he was responsible.) Obviously, since ships were frequently sent out from Corregidor and Bataan in the spring of 1942, MacArthur himself leaving with a flotilla of PT boats on March 11, ships could have equally well have been sent in. However, saving the 31,095 Americans on Bataan was not going to happen - it was the last thing Roosevelt wanted. Some clue to his thinking was his suggestion of surrender to MacArthur rather early on in February, "I authorize you to arrange for the capitulation of the Filipino elements of the defending forces..." This discloses intent. This was at a time when President Quezon controlled seventy-five percent of his country, the Japanese really only controlled the cities and the Japanese general was ready to give up. MacArthur did not think it was a good idea partly because Roosevelt, in typical fashion, had worded his letter so that MacArthur would take the blame. *5
- The Japanese main invasion on December 22 at Lingayen Gulf consisted
of three transport echelons. "The first was composed of twenty-seven
transports from Takio under the command of Rear Admiral Kensaburo Hara,
the second of twenty-eight transports from Mako under Rear Admiral Yoji
Nishimura, the third of twenty-one transports from Keeling under Rear
Admiral Sueto Hirose." This force of seventy-six transports carried the
main part of Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma's 80,000 strong
Fourteenth Army. MacArthur correctly predicted the landing site long in
advance, probably through decoded JN-25B messages. Homma's transports
were surprisingly given no air support or cover whatever. *6
With perfect timing, Washington ordered all bombers to Australia on
December 17th just as the invasion forces embarked. It was vital to
prevent the American bombers from wreaking havoc on this invasion force
when in their vulnerable transports. As it was, the Philippine Army
greatly outnumbered the Japanese and there was danger of strong
resistance, particularly in light of the marked inferior quality of
Japanese artillery and tanks. To give some idea of the devastation that
heavy strategic bombers would have caused to the Japanese transports,
MacArthur mentions that of the twelve transports that approached the
Philippines on December 10 (after Clark had been wiped out), four were
sunk and three damaged. The horrific slaughter our bombers would have
wreaked on defenseless transports is almost unimaginable. The invasion
would have been a total debacle.
- MacArthur, armed with perfect intelligence of enemy intentions from codebreaking, had from December 8 to December 22 to place his troops. He misplaced his troops at the head of Lingayen Gulf and left the obvious landing zone of the 120 mile Eastern Shore lightly defended by two Filipino divisions, one of which had no artillery. Fortunately for the Japanese, when they landed they were unopposed because the Japanese landing ships foundered horribly in the surf and it took them a long time with extreme difficulty to get their men and especially tanks and artillery ashore. When the Japanese landed, MacArthur demonstrated how hollow and false the "defend the beaches" joke was and immediately ordered the retreat to Bataan on December 24.
CONCLUSION
The destruction of MacArthur's air forces on the ground after nine hours warning and direct orders to bomb Formosa was the greatest blunder the history of war and his loss of the Philippines was the greatest defeat of the U.S. Army. It is remarkable how MacArthur escaped any reprimand, kept his command and got his fourth star on December 17th and a Congressional Medal of Honor for "gallantry and intrepidity" at Bataan where he spent part of only one day, 10 January 1942, on inspection. He was awarded the medal after he had already fled and deserted his troops. His ultimate reward was orders to leave the Philippines with his family while his soldiers were subjected to the deadly brutality of the Bataan Death March. The defense of the Philippines cannot be understood in terms of conventional military strategy. In those terms it was one incomprehensible blunder after another, done with due deliberation and afterward profusely rewarded. Just as Clauswitz said war is politics by other means, the sacrifice of the Philippines can only be understood in the larger political context. Analysis of local decisions by MacArthur, miss the point that FDR was actually calling the shots. His motivations, not MacArthur's are at issue. The sacrifice of the 31,095 Americans and 80 thousand Filipino troops with 26 thousand refugees on Bataan is a separate issue from the sacrifice of the Army Air Corps at Clark and Iba.The bombers were sacrificed, not only to facilitate the loss of the Philippines, but more immediately to sucker Hitler into declaring war on the United States and events in the Philippines are analogous to Pearl Harbor which happened the same day. However, Hitler did declare war on December 11th and therefore obviously the sacrifice of Bataan proper springs from other motives. To understand Roosevelt's strategy we have to ask a very basic question: Cui bono? "Who benefits?" Who benefited from Japan's temporary ascendancy and the war dragging on? It was obvious that when the Japanese Empire collapsed that there would be a power vacuum in Asia. The ultimate question of the Pacific War was who would fill that vacuum. Who would take China? Roosevelt wanted Russia to fill the vacuum (cf. his actions at Yalta and How the Far East Was Lost, Dr. Anthony Kubek, 1963) and therefore had to prolong the war so the Soviet Union could pick up the pieces. Because the Soviet Union had its hands full fighting Germany and could not dominate Asia until the war in Europe was under control, delay in the defeat of Japan was necessary. Bataan was a pawn in a larger game. The Battling Bastards of Bataan never understood enough to ask the critical question - "who was their real enemy?" It was Franklin Roosevelt.
The orders to fight on all beaches and not supply Bataan were nothing less than the deliberate sacrifice of 31,095 Americans.
References
1 Reminiscences, Douglas MacArthur, p 117. 2 "remove immediately", Philippines the Continuing Past, R. and L. Constantino, page 46. 3 American Ceasar, William Manchester, knew he had to go to Bataan, p 196; Cabantuan, ibid, p 215; war plans ibid p 194; January 10, ibid, p 235; Supplies lost, 4th star, Blood, Tears and Folly, Len Deighton, pp 570, 571; fish, Our Last Ditch, John Whitman, 1990. pp 46-47. 4 The Continuing Past, R. and L. Constantino, p 46. 5 Reminiscences, MacArthur, p 133, 128; Guadalcanal contrast, Oil and War, Robert Goralski and Russell Freeburg, p 157; FDR to MacArthur, Reminiscences, p 139. 6 No air cover - Fall of the Philippines, Louis Morton, 1953, official Army History, p 128.
Pre Pearl Harbor Japanese Diplomatic Intercepts
PRE-PEARL HARBOR
JAPANESE
DIPLOMATIC INTERCEPTS
MAGIC
JULY 1941 #July 7 A ____ _____ I. B. 1-155 "The Jap Govt."do not at present feel compelled to modify their policy towards the USSR." (JD 3461) *July 24 N ____ _____ ___________ Memo to Naval Aide to the President re withdrawal of Jap merchant vessels from the Atlantic Ocean. AUGUST 1941 *Aug. 4 N ____ _____ GZ-1 Jap Decisions at Imperial Conference, July 2, 1941"to break British-American encirclement and arm for all-out war. #Aug. 9 N ____ _____ GZ-4 Preparation for the southward advance shall be reinforced. OCTOBER 1941 #Oct. 8 A 5693 23220 Tokyo 647 The internal situation here"would not permit further delay. Oct. 9 A 5696 23260 Tokyo #83 Area designations in Pearl Harbor (for spy reports). Oct. 10 N 5730 23312 Honolulu #41 Dock & Mooring designations in Pearl Harbor (for spy reports). #Oct. 10 N 5738 23318 Harbin 129 Promise of American aid to Russia. #Oct. 13 N 5779 23421 Tokyo 658 "The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis." #Oct. 13 N ____ _____ GZ-9 Crisis in Japan (see JD 5779). Oct. 17 N 5898 23629 Rome 661 Evacuation of Japanese merchants from Europe. Oct. 18 N 5923 23677 Tokyo 682 Resignation of Jap cabinet. Oct. 23 A 6017 23859 Wash. Nomura submits his resignation. "I don't want to continue this hypo- critical existence deceiving other people . . . As a man of honor this is the only way open to me." (This is why Kurusu was sent.) Oct. 27 A 6084 23996 Wash. 989 "The Chief of Staff has sent the Military Attache some secret advice. Is this the future policy of the Government." Oct. 26 N 6118 24070 Mex. City 422 Sec'y Knox's statement that there would be imminent action in the Far East. *Oct. 28 N 6138 24125 Tokyo 674 Japanese nationals evacuating the N. E. I. Oct. 30 6175 24192 Wash. 1004 Talk with Adm. Pratt "Stark cannot de said to be a 'strong' individual, Admiral Pratt said. NOVEMBER 1941 DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF Nov. 4 N 6238 24322 Tokyo 343 Japanese nationals evacuating the Philippine. *Nov. 4 A 6248 24330 Tokyo 725 Counter proposals will be given in #726 & 727. Conditions are so tense that no longer is procras- tination possible. This is our last effort The success or fail- ure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. *Nov. 4 A 6249 24334 Tokyo 726 Proposal "A" Submitted in Part to State Dept. on Nov. 7, 1941. "How 24337 have we fought in China for four years. What tremendous sacrifices have we made. They must know this ... In any case, our internal situation also makes it impos- sible for us to make any further compromise." Nov. 4 A 6250 24338 Tokyo 727 Proposal "B" Never submitted. "A last effort to prevent something happening." #Nov. 4 A 6251 24339 Tokyo 730 "Ambassador Kurusu is leaving by clipper on the 7th. He is car- rying no additional instruct- ions." **Nov. 5 N 6254 24373 Tokyo 736 It is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. (Of ut- most secrecy.) #Nov. 6 A 6302 24439 Tokyo 739 We are sending Ambassador Kurusu to show our Empire's *sincerety...To make it sound good* we are telling the public... Both the Army and Navy are pleased. (Note: See JD #6017.) Nov. 7 N 6320 24479 Wash. 1040 There is danger that America will see through our condition. If we have made up our minds to a final course of action it would be the part of wisdom to keep still about it. Nov. 8 N 6335 24533 Manila 722 Spy report on U.S. aircraft in the Philippines and analysis. Nov. 12 N ____ _____ _____________ "Dissemination to White House." (This memorandum in Kramer's handwriting records reasons for giving original translations to Pres. Roosevelt (& Sec'y Hull) after Nov. 12, 1941. Prior to that time Memoranda forwarding Paraphrases of important messages had been furnished.) *Nov. 12 N 6415 24373 Tokyo 762 The United States is still not full aware of the situation here. The date set in message #736 is a definite deadline. The situa- tion is nearing a climax ... time is indeed becoming short. #Nov. 12 N 6416 24654 Tokyo 763 Germany putting pressure on Japan to get tough with the U.S. *Nov. 17 A 6541 24854 Hsinking #2 Manchukuo-Soviet Relations. (It (Appended to would impossible for us to fight #1) the Soviet Union unless something unforeseen happens. The Kwantung military command is restraining the forces there from any rash action. The Soviet is also endea- voring not to antagonize our country. **Nov. 17 A 6553 24877 Wash. 1090 Nomura's swan song. (Nov. 14, & 22. 24857 1941.) The policy of the Ameri- & can Govt. in the Pacific is to 25139 stop any northward. They are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare. Nov. 17 A 6638 24878 Tokyo Reply to Nomura. (The fate of our Empire hangs by a slender thread of a few days. I set the deadline. There will be no change.) DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF *Nov. 22 A 6710 25138 Tokyo 812 There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if the signing can be completed by *the 29th, we have decided to wait until that date*. This time we mean it that the deadline abso- lutely cannot be changed. *After that things are automatically going to happen*. Nov. 26 A 6801 25322 Tokyo 2319 Should negotiations collapse...we will completely destroy British and American power in China. Keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions. (Circular to China Net-Nov. 14, 1941.) #Nov. 26 A 6841 25344 Tokyo 836 Telephone Code (see JD 6890) Nov. 26 N 6850 25392 Tokyo 2354 Winds Code -Morse (Nov. 19, 1941- J19). *Nov. 28 N 6875 25432 Tokyo 2353 Winds Code -Voice (Nov. 19, 1941- Appended to J19). JD 6875 (Singapore version of the Winds Code. (N. E. I. (Thorpe) version of the Winds Code. (N. E. I. (Foote) version of the Winds Code. Japan-U. S.=East Wind Rain. Japan-U. S. S. R.=North Wind Cloudy. Japan-British=West Wind Clear (including N. E. I.). Nov. 28 N 6890 25443 ______________ Washington-Tokyo Telephone Con- versation Nov. 27, 1941 (2327- 2334 EST)-The South, southward matter. A crisis does appear imminent. Regarding negotiations do not break them off. We have a crisis on hand and the Army is champing at the bit (See JD 6841.) #Nov. 26 A 6891 25435 Wash. 1180 Our failure and humiliation are 6869 25436 " " complete. #Nov. 28 A 6898 25445 Tokyo 844 The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal (of Nov. 26th). Negoti- ations will be de facto ruptured. Do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off. Nov. 30 N 6921 25496 Tokyo 857 Make one more attempt. Please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations. DECEMBER 1941 #Dec. 1 N 6939 25545 Tokyo 2436 Destroying codes with chemicals. *Dec. 1 N 6942 25556 Berlin 1393 Ribbentrop said "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity." "Should Japan become engaged in a war against the U. S. Germany, of, course, would join the war immediately." Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. **Dec. 1 A 6943 25552 Tokyo 985 The conversation between Tokyo 25553 and Washington now stand rup- tured-broken. Say *very secretly* to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. Will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north. (Nov. 30, 1941.)] Note: Coded message forwarded by Com 16 as GYROF 010001, 010014, or 010027. Also forwarded from London as Admiralty #104 and #105. Admir- alty advised "Tokyo to Berlin #985 of immediate interest to]. DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF *Dec. 1 A 6944 25554 Tokyo 986 The Imperial Govt. can no longer 25555 " " continue negotiations with the U. S. The proposal presented by the U. S. On the 26th contains one insulting clause. It is clearly a trick. *The U.S. has decided to regard Japan as an enemy*. (Nov. 30, 1941.) Dec. 2 A 6974 25572 Hsinking 781 In the event that war break out with England and the U.S. persons to be interned: (a) British nat- ionals, 339; (b) American citi- zens, 81; (d) Nationals of the Soviet observed to be obnoxious characters with pro-British and American leanings are to be suitably taken care of. *Dec. 1 N 6983 25605 Tokyo 865 To prevent the U.S. from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that the negotiations are con- tinuing. The above is for only your information. (GY Log #6428.) **Dec. 1 N 6984 25606 Tokyo 2444 The four offices in London, Hong Kong. Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. (GY Log #6432.) *Dec. 2 N 6985 25609 Tokyo 2409 Hidden Word Code (Nov. 27, 1941- J19). Dec. 3 N 6991 25644 Tokyo 111 Make your "ships in harbor" report irregular but twice a week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19). **Dec. 4 N 7001 JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to be the (missing) translation of the Winds Message. *Dec. 3 A 7017 25640 Tokyo 867 Washington burn all codes except one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and "L" (LA). Stop using the code machine and destroy it com- pletely when you have finished this, wire back "HARUNA." Destroy all messages files and other secret documents. (Dec. 2, 1941.) #Dec. 4 A 7029 25694 Tokyo 114 Investigate fleet air bases in or 111 Hawaii (Nov. 20, 1941-J19.) #Dec. 5 A 7063 25773 Tokyo 113 Report ships in Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941 - J19.) #Dec. 5 A 7064 25772 Honolulu 224 Spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941) *Dec. 5 N 7086 25823 Tokyo 122 In the future report even when there are no (ship) movements (Nov 29, 1941-J19.) #Dec. 5 N 7091 25787 Tokyo 2443 London discontinue use of code machine and dispose of it immed- iately. (Dec. 1) **Dec. 4 N 7092 25783 Tokyo 893 Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Great care shall be exercised not to antag- onize Russia. (Dec. 1st.) [Note: Intercepted by Army at Fort Shafter, T. H. Received by Navy in late afternoon of Dec. 3, 1941, LCT. (GY Log #6498.)] DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF #Dec. 6 A 7111 25817 Honolulu 222 Spy report on Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor. (Nov. 18, 1941- J19.) **Dec. 6 N 7143 25843 Tokyo 902 Japanese Declaration of War. (1-13) (Parts 1-13.) (See GY Log #6619, 6620, etc.) **Dec. 7 N 7143 25843 Tokyo 902. Japanese Declaration of War (Part (14) 14.) (Very Important.) **Dec. 7 A 7145 25850 Tokyo 907 Re My #902-Submit our reply to the U. S. Govt. at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th your time. (Urgent-Very important.) *Dec. 7 A 7147 25854 Tokyo 910 After deciphering Part 14 of my 902 and also 907, 908, and 909, destroy at once the remaining cipher machine. (Extremely Urgent) **Dec. 7 N 7148 25856 Tokyo 2494 Relations between Japan and England are on the brink of catastophe (In Hidden Word Code.) (See JD #6985.) *Dec. 10 N 7280 26029 Honolulu 252 The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers. Four ships of the Honolulu class were in dock. (Dec. 5th-PAK2.) [Note: Army intercept forwarded (by mail?) from San Francisco.] DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF Dec. 11 N 7335 26108 Pek. 625 Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America (*Dec. 5th*). [NOTE: Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H. Received Dec. 10 1941-see GY Log #6749.] *Dec. 8 A 7178 25877 Honolulu 253 There is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a *surprise* attack against these places. (Dec. 6th-PAK2.) Army intercept forwarded by teletype from San Francisco.] *Dec. 8 A 7179 25874 Honolulu 254 It appears that no air recon- naissanee is being conducted by the fleet air arm. (Dec. 6th- PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded by teletype from San Francisco.] **Dec. 7 A 7184 25866 Budapest 104 On the 6th the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Govern- ment communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th. (LA). #Dec. 8 A 7212 25928 Honolulu 238 Honolulu spy report. (Nov. 28 -J19.) *Dec. 12 A 7381 26158 Tokyo 128 Honolulu wire immediately move- ments of the fleet subsequent to the 4th. (Dec. 6-PAK2) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.] DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF **Dec. 30 A 8007 27065 Tokyo 123 To Honolulu: In view of the present situation, *the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance*. Let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor. Also whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets. (Dec. 2-J19) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H. Reason for long delay not known, but apparently some one fumbled the ball. Note on translation says: "This mes- sage was received here Dec. 23."]
http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/magic.html
THE PEARL HARBOR DECEPTION - The Bones of Station H
One week before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a US Navy listening post on the other side of Oahu intercepted Admiral Yamamoto's message to the AJapanese fleet to sail to Hawaii. Today, the remains of that radio station can still be seen.
Read more: whatreallyhappened.com http://whatreallyhappened.com/content/bones-station-h-0
Fall 1941: Pearl Harbor and The Wars of Corporate America
Myth: The US was forced to declare war on Japan after a totally
unexpected Japanese attack on the American naval base in Hawaii on
December 7, 1941. On account of Japan’s alliance with Nazi Germany, this
aggression automatically brought the US into the war against Germany.
Reality: The Roosevelt administration had been eager for some time to wage war against Japan and sought to unleash such a war by means of the institution of an oil embargo and other provocations. Having deciphered Japanese codes, Washington knew a Japanese fleet was on its way to Pearl Harbor, but welcomed the attack since a Japanese aggression would make it possible to “sell” the war to the overwhelmingly anti-war American public.
Reality: The Roosevelt administration had been eager for some time to wage war against Japan and sought to unleash such a war by means of the institution of an oil embargo and other provocations. Having deciphered Japanese codes, Washington knew a Japanese fleet was on its way to Pearl Harbor, but welcomed the attack since a Japanese aggression would make it possible to “sell” the war to the overwhelmingly anti-war American public.
Read more: whatreallyhappened.com http://whatreallyhappened.com/node/371782#ixzz3UYnoDXsG
Pearl Harbor Roosevelt's 911
Up until then, however, Americans had overwhelmingly opposed involvement in World War II. They had been thoroughly disillusioned by the First World War:
although they had been told they would be fighting for “democracy” in that previous war, taxpayers learned from the postwar Graham Committee of Congress that they’d been defrauded out of some $6 billion in armaments that were never manufactured or delivered1;
atrocity tales about German soldiers (such as cutting the hands off thousands of Belgian children) had turned out to be fabrications;
the sinking of the Lusitania – the central provocation that ultimately led to the U.S. declaration of war – had been committed by Germany not to kill women and children (as propaganda claimed), but to prevent tens of tons of war munitions from reaching the European front. (Click here for a debunking of the Lusitania myth.)
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